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FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY OR STATE
COURT RECEIVERSHIP*
JAMES E. MCCARTY**
This subject requires consideration of the legal effect of chapter 128
of the Wisconsin Statutes of 1961, the legislative history thereof, the
state court decisions construing and interpreting these various sections,
and the history, legal effect, and scope of the federal bankruptcy act.
History of the Federal Bankruptcy Act
The United States Constitution' gives Congress the power "to
establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout
the United States." This clause did not obligate Congress to pass a
federal bankruptcy law nor did it deny the power of the states to pass
bankruptcy or insolvency laws.2
The first bankruptcy act was passed in 1800 and repealed less than
four years later, and until 1841 there was no federal bankruptcy law
in the United States. The second federal bankruptcy act was enacted
in 1841 and was repealed within two or three years. The third federal
bankruptcy act was passed in 1867 and repealed in 1878. The fourth
federal bankruptcy act was passed in 1898, so that for about twenty
years we had no bankruptcy act. The present basic federal bankruptcy
act was that of 1898, which was completely revised by the Chandler
Act in 1938.
Congress has exercised its constitutional power by enacting bank-
ruptcy legislation. The power of Congress is paramount and state laws
in competition with the subject matter covered by Congress are super-
seded.3 The doctrine has been well settled
that state insolvency laws which are tantamount to bankruptcy
because they provide for an administration of the debtor's assets
in a winding up of his affairs similar to that provided by the
national act, are suspended while the latter remains in force and
proceedings under them are utterly null and void whether com-
menced within four months of the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy or before.
4
*This article is based upon a paper presented to the Board of Circuit Judges
of the State of Wisconsin on August 26, 1964.
**LL.B., Marquette University (1927) ; Referee in Bankruptcy for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin (since 1953) ; police judge, Shorewood, Wisconsin(1945-1953) ; assistant district attorney, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin (1930-
1931) ; first vice-president, National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy;
member, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, American, and Seventh Federal Circuit Bar
Associations; former member, Executive Committee and Judicial Selection
Committee, Milwaukee Bar Association.
I Art. I, §8, ch. 4.
2 Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
3 Ibid.; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Straton v. New
283 U.S. 318 (1930).
4 Straton v. New, supra note 3, at 327.
BANKRUPTCY OR RECEIVERSHIP
History of Chapter 128 of the Wisconsin Statutes of 1961
Chapter 80 of the Revised Wisconsin Statutes of 1878 related en-
tirely to voluntary assignments and prescribed regulations therefor.
Provisions for the discharge of debtors were added by enactment of
chapter 385 of the Laws of 1889, subsequent revisions placed the dis-
charge provisions relating to voluntary assignments in chapter 80, and
thereafter chapter 80 was renumbered chapter 128. Please note that
these laws were enacted by the Wisconsin legislature during the period
when no federal bankruptcy act was in force or effect.
In 1926, after the Congress of the United States had enacted the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, our state supreme court had occasion to
consider the validity of the dicharge provisions of chapter 128, and the
court held that the provisions of said chapter relating to the discharge
of insolvent debtors- were completely superseded by the federal bank-
ruptcy act as to all matters comprehended within that legislation., It
was only the discharge features which were declared to be suspended
and wholly superseded by the federal bankruptcy act, while the other
features relating to voluntary assignments were held to be still in
force and effect and not in contravention of nor in conflict with the
federal act. The court, in effect, held that the discharge features of
chapter 128 were separable from those relating to voluntary assign-
ments.
In 1932, the Wisconsin court again considered chapter 128 of the
Wisconsin Statutes of 1929 in Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co.,7 and
again held that the provisions of said chapter, absent the discharge
features, were enacted for the purpose of regulating voluntary assign-
ments and were not in conflict with nor in contravention of the fed-
eral bankruptcy act. Since both Tarnowski and Pobreslo were, in fact,
voluntary assignments, there was no need in those areas to decide the
validity of other sections of chapter 128. After the aforesaid decisions,
the discharge features of chapter 128 were repealed.8 Chapter 128 was
again amended by chapter 308 of the Wisconsin Laws of 1939. These
were the Wisconsin statutes in force at the time of the decision of the
Honorable Robert E. Tehan, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in In re Wiwconsin Builders
Supply Co.9
Judge Tehan's exhaustive opinion affirmed the order of the then
referee in bankruptcy enjoining the state court receiver under chapter
128 from proceeding further with liquidating or administering the assets
of the corporation, and directed the state court receiver to turn over the
5 Wis. Laws 1889, ch. 385.6 Voluntary Assignment of Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 210 N.W. 836 (1926).
7210 Wis. 20, 242 N.W. 725 (1932).
8 Wis. Laws 1937, ch. 431.
9 136 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
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assets to the bankruptcy court trustee. In Wisconsin Builders there was
a voluntary assignment in October 1951 for the benefit of creditors of
said corporation, and the assignee was subsequently appointed receiver
by the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, the physical assets of the
corporation were sold, and the sale was duly confirmed by the circuit
court order. However, before any distribution had been made, the
assignor, Wisconsin Builders, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin on June 6, 1952, and a bankruptcy trustee was subsequently ap-
pointed by the federal court. Over seven months had elapsed between
the appointment of the state court receiver and the filing of the volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy.
It must be conceded that the bankruptcy court has the full power
and authority to require receivers or trustees appointed in proceedings
not under the act "to deliver the property in their possession or under
their control to the ... trustee . . . debtor or other person entitled to
such property"'10 as the case may be, provided that the receiver or trustee
was appointed within four months prior to the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy. A state court receivership is superseded by ad-
judication of bankruptcy." In the instant case, since more than four
months had elapsed since the appointment of the state court receiver,
the federal court could not obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the assets
in the state court receiver's possession unless the state court proceedings
were tantamount to bankruptcy. However, the state court proceedings
were held to be insolvency proceedings and the lien created thereby
null and void because of conflict with the Bankruptcy Act.
The principle is now well settled that while federal bankruptcy
statutes supersede state bankruptcy statutes, bankruptcy does not super-
sede a state court proceeding for the enforcement of a lien and the ap-
pointment of a receiver therein where the institution of the suit created a
valid lien or was for the enforcement of a valid existing lien obtained
more than four months prior to bankruptcy.
judge Tehan, in Wisconsin Builders, after a thorough discussion of
all the provisions of the then chapter 128, held that the only substantial
difference between the Wisconsin act and the federal bankruptcy act
was that the state act did not provide for a discharge; that as to cor-
porations such as the bankrupt, the granting of a discharge was mean-
ingless; that all of the provisions of the then chapter 128 dealing with
marshalling, liquidation, and ratability of the debtor's assets were sus-
pended during the existence of the Bankruptcy Act; that chapter 128
'°Bankruptcy Act §§ 2a (21), 52 Stat. 844 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21)
(Supp. V, 1963).
II In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 789 & 798 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 946 (1951) ; 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 2.78, at 369-70 (14th ed. 1962).
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constituted a comprehensive system covering both voluntary and in-
voluntary actions; and that the act did not lend itself to the application
of the doctrine of severability. Upon appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Tehan and stated as
follows:
A comparison of the.provisions of Chapter 128. with those of
the prior act compels a conclusion that Chapter 128, except for
the involuntary provisions, is substantially a re-enactment of the
earlier law. We fail to find any significant departures which
would cause Chapter 128 to be legislation 'tantamount to bank-
ruptcy.' There is little that is new. The character and purpose of
the Act is the same, i.e., judicial supervision of general assign-
ments for the benefit of creditors. The powers and procedures
have been altered somewhat, but not in any significant re-
spect ... 12
The court further held that
Chapter 128 is an expansion of the prior Wisconsin general as-
signment legislation but it has not been turned into a system of
insolvency administration opposed to the Bankruptcy Act, at least
as concerns its voluntary provisions.13
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, since it
held that the involuntary provisions of chapter 128 were suspended by
the federal bankruptcy act but the voluntary provisions were not so
suspended, and, in disagreement with Judge Tehan, that the involuntary
provisions could be severed while the voluntary provisions could be
sustained.
Thus, after years of litigation in the courts, both federal and state,
it appears that chapter 128 of the Wisconsin statutes, insofar as it
merely regulates or controls voluntary assignments for the benefit of
creditors, is valid and not in conflict with the federal bankruptcy act.
While the litigation nd legislatidn relative to state court and fed-
eral jurisdiction in Wisconsin in receiverships and insolvency matters
would now at long last appear to be settled, this is not so because, after
Wisconsin Builders, the Wisconsin legislature again amended chapter
128 by enactment of chapter 274 of the Laws of 1957. The present law
relates to voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors; defines in-
solvency; makes provision for dissolution of liens; voids preferences;
sequesters property; appoints and vests title in receivers and provides
for their supervision; and provides for meetings of creditors, the filing
and adjudication of claims, examination of debtors, and liquidation and
distribution of assets.
Where formerly section 128.05 provided that upon the filing of the
12239 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1956). "
13 Id. at 656.
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assignment the court shall designate the receiver, the statute now pro-
vides that the court upon filing of the assignment shall order the as-
signee to administer the debtor's estate, said assignee to be vested with
powers of a receiver.
Section 128.06, condemned in Wisconsin Builders, was repealed. The
provisions of the present section 128.06 are immaterial herein for the
purposes of this discussion.
Section 128.08, formerly entitled "Insolvent corporations; receiver,
custodian," has been repealed and is now entitled "Receiver; custodian"
and provides as follows:
(1) The court within the proper county may sequestrate the
property of a debtor and appoint a receiver therefor:
(a) When an execution against a judgment debtor is re-
turned unsatisfied in whole or in part.
(b) When a corporation has been dissolved or is insol-
vent or is in imminent danger of insolvency or has forfeited its
corporate rights.
(2) Upon application duly made, the court shall appoint as
receiver the person nominated by the petitioning creditor or
creditors, subject to [section] 128.10.
Subsection (b) of section 128.08 is the same as subsection (4) of sec-
tion 268.16. There are other Wisconsin statutes relating to appointment
of receivers in chapters 273, 286, and 180.
The order of distribution as set forth in section 128.17 was changed
by the most recent enactment. Whereas formerly payment of taxes,
assessments, and debts due the United States followed wages due work-
men, etc., and were on a parity with taxes and debts due to state,
county, district, or municipality, such taxes, assessments, and debts due
the United States were given a higher priority under the 1957 amend-
ment so that they are now to be paid after the costs of preserving the
estate and the costs of administration. This differs from the distribu-
tion provided by section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides a
fourth priority for taxes owing by the bankrupt to the United States or
any state or any subdivision thereof and a fifth priority for debts owing
to the United States, the priority and payment to the United States being
subsequent to costs and expenses of administration and wages due work-
men. The reason for this change is evident since it would be impossible
for the state court to distribute in this manner because of the provisions
of section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, which provides as follows:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insol-
vent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands
of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the
debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States
shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall
extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient
[Vol. 48
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property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment there-
of, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed,
or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in
which an act of bankruptcy is committed. 14
This section, however, does not apply to proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act insofar as debts due the United States for taxes are con-
cerned. This change in the state statute results in a different distribu-
tion from that provided under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Where formerly the court was empowered to sequestrate the property
of the debtor and appoint a receiver therefor when an execution against
a domestic corporation was returned unsatisfied, it is now, under the
new section 128.08, empowered to sequestrate said property and appoint
a receiver when an execution against a judgment debtor (individual,
partnership, association, domestic or foreign corporation) is returned
unsatisfied, and when a corporation has been dissolved, is insolvent,
is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate
rights. Do the provisions of section 128.08, when construed in conjunc-
tion with the other applicable provisions of chapter 128 except those
relating to voluntary assignments, constitute an insolvency law? The
absence of a discharge feature is not the sole test to be applied in de-
termining whether a state act is suspended or inoperative. Federal courts
have held specifically that state acts may be suspended by the federal
act even though the state acts do not provide for a discharge. 15 In the
case of In re Weedman Stave Co.,' 6 the court said:
The first question to be determined is whether the Arkansas
statute, under which the proceedings in the state court were had,
is an insolvency law. What constitutes an insolvency law? The
elements of an insolvency law are insolvency, surrender of prop-
erty, its administration by a receiver or trustee, distribution of
the assets among the creditors, and a provision for priorities or
other matters not permissible in the absence of such a statute.
A provision for the discharge of the debtor from the unpaid bal-
ances of his debts is not essential to make it an insolvency law.17
In Iternational Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,I which involved the Arkansas
statute, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily ex-
cludes state regulation. It is apparent, without comparison in
detail of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act with those of the
Arkansas statute, that intolerable inconsistencies and confusion
would result if that insolvency law be given effect while the na-
tional Act is in force. Congress did not intend to give insolvent
14 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
15 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1917) ; In re Salmon & Salmon, 143 Fed.
395 (W.D. Mo. 1906); In re Smith, 92 Fed. 135 (D. Ind. 1899).16199 Fed. 948 (E.D. Ark. 1912).
17Id. at 950.28278 U.S. 261 (1929).
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debtors seeking discharge, or their creditors seeking to collect
claims, choice between the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Act
and that specified in state insolvency laws. States may not pass or
enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy
Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations. 9
It appears, therefore, that the provisions of section 128.08, when con-
sidered with sections of the chapter other than the voluntary as-
signment portion, may be held to be an insolvency law. In one author's
opinion, these provisions are clearly invalid.20
It must be conceded that for over 100 years the return of an un-
satisfied execution against a judgment debtor is a recognized ground
for the appointment of a receiver. As to an individual debtor, these
proceedings have always been instituted pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 273 of the Wisconsin statutes, entitled "Remedies Supplement-
ary to Execution." In the latter instance, the receiver obtains an equit-
able lien on behalf of the judgment creditor, which lien is recognized as
valid in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding if the lien was obtained
more than four months prior to bankruptcy. 21
There is no question but that the state has the right and, in fact, the
duty to see to the proper winding up of the affairs of the dissolved cor-
poration or a corporation which has forfeited its charter, and may, of
course, properly provide statutory regulations therefor. Does the state
have the right to appoint a receiver and grant him powers to set aside
liens and preferences, liquidate the assets of the judgment debtor, cor-
porate or otherwise, and distribute the debtor's estate among all his
creditors according to the provided statutory distribution which differs
from the distribution provided by the Bankruptcy Act, if the judgment
debtor is insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency? May a state,
absent some voluntary act on the part of the debtor such as a voluntary
assignment, liquidate the corporate assets when the corporation is insol-
vent or in imminent danger of insolvency, or are such proceedings tanta-
mount to bankruptcy resulting in supersedure by the federal bankruptcy
act, and are such laws suspended as long as there is a federal bankruptcy
act in full force and effect? It must be admitted that there is inherent
power in equity courts to appoint a receiver of an insolvent corporation
and such authority does not depend for its vitality upon any statutory
provisions, as statutory provisions do not create the remedy.22 If the
courts are exercising a power which was inherent in the equity courts
prior to the enactment of the federal bankruptcy act, we must assume
19 Id. at 265.
20 Comment, A Challenge to the Validity of Certain Sections of Wisconsin's
Chapter 128,45 MARQ. L. REv. 403 (1961).
21 Straton v. New, supra note 3; Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U.S. 165 (1902) ; Atlantic
Flooring & Insulation Co. v. Oberdorfer Ins. Agency, 136 F.2d 457 (5th
Cir. 1943) ; Alexander v. Wald, 231 Wis. 530, 286 N.W. 6 (1939).
22 Hazelwood v. Third & Wells Realty Co., 205 Wis. 85, 236 N.W. 591 (1931).
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that the proceedings are valid, but it is extremely difficult to determine
whether the provisions of chapter 128, absent the voluntary assignment
provisions, are, in fact, an insolvency law or a regulation of an equity re-
ceivership.23 At any rate, it cannot be doubted that the provisions of
chapter 128, as amended by chapter 274 of the Laws of 1957, are at least
open to attack and there is a possibility that this law may be held to be
in contravention of the federal bankruptcy statutes. If so, all proceed-
ings thereunder in the state courts would be superseded by the federal
bankruptcy act and suspended while said federal act is in force and
effect. If the procedings, resulting in the appointment of a reciver by
reason of an execution returned unsatisfied or because of the insolvency
or imminent danger of insolvency of a debtor, are only in the nature of
an equitable attachment of the property of a debtor for the benefit of
creditors, it is most probably a valid exercise of the inherent powers of
the court of equity. However, if the Wisconsin law is suspended, even
though more than four months have elapsed between the appointment
of the state court receiver and the filing of the bankruptcy petition, or
if a petition for reorganization24 or real property arrangement 25 is filed
so that the four month rule does not apply,26 or if the bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed within the four month period, the result is two liquidations
with the additional possibility that if the state court proceeding is held
to be a system of insolvency administration in conflict with the Bank-
ruptcy Act and therefore void, actions may be instituted to set aside all
transfers and conveyances made during the state receivership.
Bankruptcy actions in the United States courts are "actions in rem"
and essentially creditors' actions. Creditors have many rights not granted
to them by state law. They may appoint a creditors' committee and the
trustee,27 whereas in the state court voluntary assignment proceedings
the assignee is selected by the debtor and most probably, in many in-
stances, is not unfriendly toward the debtor. When a creditor with exe-
cution returned unsatisfied seeks liquidation of the debtor under chapter
128, he is primarily interested only in collecting his own debt and he
may bring the action even though only a nominal amount may be due
upon his debt and, if satisfied, he will dismiss or not file the action.
In state court proceedings, little use is made of discovery under sec-
tion 128.16 of the Wisconsin statutes and the debtor or corporate
representatives of the debtor are seldom examined under oath. In bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the debtor, and if a corporation, the officers, are
23 In re Schwartz Bros., 58 F. Supp. 761 (D. Minn. 1945).
24 Bankruptcy Act, ch. X, 52 Stat 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502-665 (Supp. V, 1963).
25 Bankruptcy Act, ch. X, 52 Stat. 916 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§801-926 (1958).26Bankruptcy Act § 2a(21), 52 Stat. 844 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (21) (Supp.
V, 1963).
27 Bankruptcy Act § 44, 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 72 (1958).
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examined at the first meeting of creditors and are subject to further
examination under the provisions of section 21a of the Bankruptcy
Act; and any person may be examined under the provisions of said
federal statute concerning the acts, conduct, and property of the bank-
rupt. A dishonest or unscrupulous bankrupt may succeed in defrauding
his creditors or in perpetrating a fraud upon the court by the means and
machinery of a voluntary assignment or state court receivership, where-
as he is not likely to succeed in accomplishing the fraud in a bankruptcy
proceeding. This is because Congress has set up in the federal court
system and in the administrative office of the court an elaborate system
for the administration of bankruptcy proceedings, and the state has
made no special provisions for its courts in this respect. Fraudulent
concealment or transfer of property, etc., are bankruptcy crimes. 28 If,
during the course of a proceeding, suspicious circumstances arise, the
matter is reported to the appropriate United States Attorney, 29 who has
at his command the full investigative powers of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Costs of administration in bankruptcy cases is a matter of continu-
ing concern to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and he has urged the courts to bring about a more economical
administration of bankruptcy cases. These costs are likewise of equal
concern to the Judicial Conference of the United States. A series of
studies of these costs was recently completed by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. These costs, which include receivers
and trustees costs and expenses; reporting, accounting and auctioneers'
fees; attorneys fees for creditors, receivers, and trustees; rent and other
expenses; and contributions to the Referees' Salary and Expense Fund,
amounted to 26.4 per cent in asset cases having an average realization
of $5,688.00, and this is considered too high. The average costs of ad-
ministration in the Eastern District of Wisconsin amounted to 24.8 per
cent. Since receivers' fees and trustees' fees are strictly limited in asset
cases by section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act and since attorney fees and
all other fees are subject to the economical spirit of the Bankruptcy
Act, it would appear that bankruptcy proceedings are less costly than
state court liquidation proceedings.
In fiscal year 1964, 171,719 bankruptcy cases were filed in the United
States, a 10.4 per cent increase over the prior year. Of this number,
2,615 cases were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin and approximately 700 in the Western District
of Wisconsin. About 10 per cent of these cases are business or asset
cases. A check of the files of the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County dis-
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-54 (1958).
29 18 U.S.C. § 3057 (1958).
[Vol. 48
1964-65] BANKRUPTCY OR RECEIVERSHIP 349
closes that only 17 voluntary assignments and 9 receiverships were filed
in the calendar year 1963. If approximately the same number of re-
ceiverships and voluntary assignments are being filed in the state courts
throughout the state of Wisconsin, it is apparent that the greater num-
ber of business insolvencies are being administered in the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
This discussion is not intended to be the last word on the subject
matter. Indeed, it is the author's belief that this topic does not lend
itself to black letter rules. It is hoped, however, that the thoughts dis-
cussed herein may be of some assistance and serve as a guide for par-
ticipation in proceedings under chapter 128 of the Wisconsin statutes.
